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Washington,  D.C.—The endemical ly  
authoritarian Middle East is embracing political 
change, yet the United States is bracing for 
the worst .  U.S. policymakers are fi  nding 
they can claim very little credit for the wave 
of democratically inspired events, and they 
foresee few benefi ts arising from the surge of 
demonstrations and strikes.  The quandary they 
face is how to explain to the American people one 
of the great foreign policy failures in U.S. history.
Playing on U.S. national security fears 
allows autocratic partners to dictate their 
interests to the United States.  Funneling aid 
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to gain policy concessions from dictatorial 
regimes, nurtures animosity that prevents the 
U.S. from exercising meaningful leverage when 
change fi nally becomes possible.  A legacy 
of bitterness makes it likely that reformist 
leaders will be compelled to prove themselves 
through anti-American postures.  In the worst 
case democracy itself falls out of favor being 
interpreted as too American. These are the 
larger lessons for U.S. policy makers from the 
fall of Hosni Mubarak. 
No one perfected the art of double dealing 
better than Mubarak; he maintained offi cial 
and business ties with the U.S., and keeps the 
border with Gaza closed while his political 
allies fan populist anger against the U.S. and 
Israel.  He blocked all U.S. efforts to strengthen 
social networks, cooperatives, unions and all 
other civil society vehicles to a more responsive 
government, yet no leader received a more 
consistent fl ow of rewards from Washington.
The Middle East has received more U.S. 
aid per capita than any other part of the globe. 
Instead of greater trust, however, the U.S. 
dividend has been a decline in popularity.
Figure 1: U.S. is the least popular in countries where its aid is the most abundant
 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2007 
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U.S. popularity is lowest among the Arab 
populations in the Middle East that receive 
the most aid. This is no surprise to policy 
experts, since much of the aid is distributed 
“strategically,” in the form of private benefi ts 
to small, ruling coalitions in order to obtain 
policy concessions that are rarely popular 
among the population as a whole. This strategic 
distribution is hidden from the American 
public. 
Explaining the divergence between rhetoric 
and reality to the U.S. public is tricky. U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East typically 
empowers four types of actors. First, are the 
“initiators” of the policy: the foreign policy 
bureaucrats and political operators in the U.S. 
Departments of State and Defense, and in the 
National Security Council who, while subject 
to budget constraints, must aim for the most 
strategic impact of U.S. resources.  The second 
group includes their transaction partners 
overseas, usually elites who understand they 
are receiving resources for which they owe 
nothing to their own people.  Both they and the 
U.S. initiators share the goal of remaining in 
power at home.  To succeed, both must co-opt 
the third and fourth sets of actors: the non-elite 
populations at home and abroad.  This is where 
the gap between the rhetoric and reality of 
foreign policy arises.
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Figure 2: The hypocrisy trap: two stories and four audiences
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That co-option consists of a noble lie that 
links aid with democracy promotion.  It is 
constructed to conceal the strategic logic of aid 
transfers while building support at home.  The 
noble lie often cites what Joseph Nye pioneered 
as “soft power”: linking aid disbursements to a 
broad geopolitical agenda that prioritizes base 
rights, U.N. votes, support for global free trade, 
and access to low-cost natural resources.  The 
lie often includes an overstatement designed to 
evoke sympathy or fear, or to mislead the public 
into believing that a grand and urgent cause—
e.g., the campaign against global communism or 
terror—is being served.  Overstatements aim to 
make foreign aid designated for undemocratic, 
repressive governments more palatable when it 
otherwise might jar the democratic sensibilities 
of the voting public at home that foots the bill. 
Overstatements also cloud general awareness 
of the pernicious lie shared and understood by 
the foreign policy elites at home and abroad.  For 
them, soft power means that the United States 
will try to attain its goals by courting foreign 
offi cials and providing them with the resources 
they need to stay in power. The soft power of 
foreign aid thus becomes a weapon of bribery. 
The institutionalized hypocrisy that results 
can more easily be concealed from domestic 
audiences than from the public overseas who are 
victims of the overt contradiction between the 
advertised priorities and the reality.  The hypocrisy 
is made more blatant by the daily espousal by U.S. 
leaders of the virtues of democracy. 
Democracy is often cited for its capacity 
to draw upon the expertise and knowledge of 
all its citizens, and thus its great capacity for 
self-correction.  If leaders tell lies, we expect 
that the democratic process will provide 
remedies.  But such self-correcting mechanisms 
are often absent in foreign policy planning 
because the negative policy effects are often 
borne solely by populations overseas.  Because 
the aid enables autocrats to postpone necessary 
reforms (instead, they consolidate support from 
a close circle of insiders), their nations suffer 
the deterioration of institutional quality and a 
contraction of provisions for the public good 
such as education and access to justice.  Hence 
the angry crowds in the streets of Cairo.
Using foreign aid for soft power creates 
false expectations, and the lies create dissension 
at home and anti-U.S. sentiment overseas.  The 
Obama administration started this last round of 
expectation-building in the Middle East with the 
president’s 2009 speech in Cairo which led the 
people in the Middle East to believe that they 
had a defender in Washington.  But by trying 
to claim more sympathy than his predecessors, 
he infl amed the population overseas with 
heightened expectations, creating risks of an 
even greater backlash downstream should the 
expectations not be met. 
The political crisis in the Middle East is 
far from over, but the ability of the U.S. to 
play a necessary role in its resolution has been 
signifi cantly impaired.  To be successful there, 
policy planners must either enhance their ability 
to disguise the hypocrisy or to reduce the need for 
it.  To try to do both, they will fail at both. The 
fi rst option is made less likely by today’s open 
information environment.  The second option 
means taking a long, hard look at how U.S. 
overseas assistance falls into a hypocrisy trap, and 
to challenge the foreign policy complex composed 
of ideologies, interests and domestic institutions 
that have identifi ed the American government 
with the embodiment of Arab authoritarianism. 
U.S. policymakers use foreign aid as a way 
of ensuring America’s security and economic 
interests by contributing to the stability of the 
Middle East.  But in the end, by ignoring the 
link between social and political development, 
it may have compromised both U.S. security 
and the long-term regional stability. 
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